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ARGUMENT

FOR REPLY TO THE BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, APPELLANTS

RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING REBUTTAL:
RESPONDENTS STATEMENT OP THE FACTS
Mountain Bell

attempts to cloud over the fact that this

case precipitated from an original and still pending case in the
Third Judicial District Court.

The District Court case was

stayed pursuant to mutual stipulation of the parties after
Mountain Bell had asserted the District Court did not have
primary original jurisdiction to hear "certain" matters raised in
the District Court suit. A resolution of all questions as to
what and what is not the primary and original jurisdiction of the
1

PSC regarding the claims raised by Plaintiffs against Mountain
Bell and others is respectfully requested from the Supreme Court.
Otherwise, both the parties and the District Court will remain in
a quandry as to the proper division of responsibilities.
As for the findings, they speak for themselves, and it
seems quite presumptuous for Mountain Bell to attempt through its
recital of its own version to embelish them with comments which
have no basis in the facts.

Such phrases as "following a normal

billing cycle", "receiving and investigating a complaint",
"Mountain Bell discovered", "as part of a comprehensive reorganization of the general exchange tariff", "did not explicitly
permit", "because the tariff did permit cross-billing between
business accounts", "account for business service", "facing the
prospect of disconnection of his individual business service",
and "to determine the validity and applicability of the tariff
provision under which Mountain Bell was proceeding" need to be
seen by the honorable justices of the Supreme Court for what they
are —

charicatures of the true matters of fact and an attempt by

Mountain Bell to cloud over and camoflauge real issues and insert
desired "facts" which are not clearly facts in this matter.
Particularly, there is no specific evidence creating the clarity
of the facts as charicatured by Mountain Bell.
Mountain Bell has also, in reciting the tariffs regarding
transfer of accounts from one account to another, attempted to
insert facts not in the record regarding dates of tariffs and the
entire paragraph on page 5 of Mountain Bell's brief beginning
2

with "This tariff provision was part of a comprehensive revision
of basic exchange tariffs..." and ending with "McCune's Complaint
in the Public Service Commission was filed on March 7, 1985, " is
not supported by credible evidence in the record and the record
made reference to does not support the charicatured serf serving
allegations attempted to be asserted in the honorable justices'
minds to be the proven facts.
Moreover, it doesn't matter beans when the PSC complaint
in this matter was filed as it pertains to the tariff in effect
on transfer of accounts on the date of filing the PSC complaint.
The valid law in effect when an "action arises" is the time when
pertinent regulations, statutes, common law, case law, and
constitutional provisions in existence at the time the action
arose must be considered.
RESPONDENT'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Mountain Bell makes a statement in its second paragraph
of summary of arguments that, "This Court should accord
considerable deference to the Commission's decision on this
question involving the application of law (the tariff) to
specific facts."

This is a misguided statement not addressing

the true law in existence in this state regarding review of PSC
actions and the correct nature of regulations ("tariff" being
just a mystifying word unique to the public utilities industry
for a good old fashioned regulation, and one fashioned and
written by the utility itself to boot in most instances).
Regulations, first of all, are law only to that extent they
3

comply with constitutional and statutory law enacted by the
people.

Regulations are just what they say they are, provisions

to carry out the provisions of paramount consitutional and
statutory law.

If a regulation runs contrary to the supreme

constitutional and statutory and interpretive case lawf the
regulation is nothing more than a bunch of words without power,
void, dead, and improper.
In addition, Mountain Bell tries very hard to avoid this
honorable Supreme Court's precedent which states that this
honorable Supreme Court takes no deference to the PSC's reasoning
when general constitutional and other law is concerned.

See

previously cited Big K Corp v PSCf 689 P2d 1149 (Utah 1984) and
Utah Dept. of Administrative Services v PSCf 658 P2d 601 (Utah
1983).

General law and constitutional law applies here because

the transfer tariffs in question here are applicable to legal
business entities and individual non-business-conducting-citizens
and Mountain Bell is attempting to self legislate itself around
the general law pertaining to partnerships and other business
entities and their sanctity as distinct separate legal entities.
Other reasons why general law is directly at issue exist.
The third paragraph of Mountain Bell's summary of
arguments states that consitutional rights were not violated
using the attempted scapegoat that there was no "state action",
but Mountain Bell has completely attempted to close the Supreme
Court's eye to the existence of our own state Consitution1s same
standards —
4

indeed even broader standards —

giving all of the

residents and citizens of this great state the right to due
process, equal protection, and all of the other fundamental
rights enumerated in our Utah State Consitution and cited on
pages 23 and 24 of Appellants' Brief.

Alsof to treat partners

differently in the law in the carved out situation of public
utility services is unequal isn't it?

If we can say it is

something equal, I am dumbfounded regarding the logic.

Mountain

Bell also summarizes in the same paragraph that the "interpretation" of the pertinent tarriffs were just and reasonable.
Mountain Bell is trying to say the PSC took a proper look at the
tariffs involved and construed them as they should be and looked
at them consitutionally and legally by holding up established
case law to them and they stood the muster.

That is just not so.

The PSC went on an irrational trajectory away from the proper
course, never considered Josephson v Mt. Bell's mandates
established as case precedent law in this state in 1978, never
looked at the definition of "customer" in the tariff defining
"customer", never applied the hardened steel principles of
partnership liquidation and personal partner liability, and
rather overlooked the distinctions between monopolistic public
utilities and businesses in the free marketplace.
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT, POINT I.
Mountain Bell starts out in its first argument point on
page 7 by trying to show the PSC interpreted the tariff on
transfer of accounts from one telephone number to another by
"necessary implication" and found it was just and reasonable.
5

Plaintiffs agree that the PSC has the power to approve, suspend,
or modify tariffs and rules and regulations filed by a public
utility. Plaintiffs further have no qualms about the PSC's
emphatic duty to do so.

This must bef however, so that the

regulations and practices of public utilities conform to law,
both statutory and case law and constitutional law.

See 54-7-20

OCA 1953 cited on page 17 of Appellants1 Brief.
The PSC was asked and it had a duty to decide if the
tariffs in question were lawful, constitutional, just, reasonable, proper, adequate, or sufficient and if they are not to
prescribe rules and regulations which are, including establishing
methods to be observed, furnished, enforced, and employed.
54-4-7 OCA 1953 cited on page 15 of Appellants1 Brief.
PSC do this.

See

Did the

No, not by the longest shot in this world!

The PSC should have but it shirked its responsibility.
It evidentally needs to be counseled and schooled more closely
regarding its duties more thoroughly by the people through the
voice of their Supreme Court.
Mountain Bell goes on on page 9 of its brief to try and
get this honorable Supreme Court to let Mountain Bell legislate a
unique and prejudicial tariff for itself and to allow the
misguided judgment of the PSC regarding interpretation of the
transfer of accounts tariffs to be given deference.

But as

previously stated, general law and consitutional law applies here
and the PSC should have applied it but it did not or did not
desire to apply it. Mountain Bell's rationale would allow them
6

to create their own lawf as they are trying here, without
question —

the same as a despot —

not a public utility subject

to a higher degree of responsibility to individual citizens and
businesses than the regular free enterprise businesses.

Mountain

Bell is trying to get the Supreme Court to look away, but the
Supreme Court will look straight at the matter as the PSC should
have done.
On page 11 of Mountain Bell's brief, the telephone
company argues that partners are liable for partnership debt.
But they do not deny that the principles about partnerships
established in concrete in this nation do not allow partners to
become personally liable to execution until after partnership
assets are looked to first.

Mountain Bell's illogical reasoning

is that just because the individual sole proprietor to whom the
partnership bill was attached was a customer of Mountain Bell,
Mountain Bell could assess the partnership bill to him.
The above illogic would mean anybody can be liable at
Mountain Bell's whim for any bill they choose.

The tariff on

"customer" definition does not say anything of the kind.

In

fact, it is consistent with the general law recognizing the
distinctness of sole proprietorships, partnerships, corporations,
and government agencies when it comes to contracts and who is
responsible for them.

The complete language of the tariff

defining "customer" reads:
A personf firmf corporationr or governmental agency
responsible for paying the telephone bills and for
complying with the rules and regulations of the
Company. A2.2.1, Mountain Bell Tariffs.
7

"Customer" is the legal entity as can be seen from the
definition.

The person (a non-business involved individual or a

sole proprietor), a firm (partnership), corporation or government
agency are responsible.

The PSC should have strictly construed

this definition tariff but they did not.
Josephson v Mt. Bell requires them to do so, however.

See page

16 of Appellants1 Brief and page 852 of the Josephson decision.
A partner, though secondarily liable if there are not
enough partnership assets to satisfy partnership debt, is not the
"customer" when it is a partnership telephone account.

There is

no dispute in fact that the telephone bill transferred was
originally a partnership debt.

See R2 and 90.

On page 13 of Mountain Bell's brief, it talks about costeffectiveness but there was no evidence submitted proving any of
the assumptions stated by Mountain Bell.

As previously cited in

Appellants1 Brief, such cannot be considered by the PSC.
Utah Power & Light Co. v. PSC, 152 P2d 542 (Utah).

See

The PSC also

inserted certain "facts" not in the record through their
misguided reasoning focused on rates and customer cost.

But

there really was nothing at all presented in the way of evidence
to show how many times the telephone company would have to resort
to civil courts to collect accounts, particularly against
partners of partnerships.

Nor was there any evidence presented

at all about costs to the consumer which would have to be passed
on if traditional civil courts were used from time to time such
as small claims and the like.
8

There just wasn't any evidence.

But Mountain Bell and the PSC ande its administrative judge
assumed some assumptions which have no basis in any facts proven
at hearing.
On page 13, Mountain Bell also talks about "policy"
generally towards "customers".

But the customer in this parti-

cular fiasco was the partnership —

not the partner who had the

partnership bill tacked on to his sole proprietor account without
Mountain Bell first having complied with the partnership law
requiring looking to partnership assets before going to task to
deprive the partner of personal property.
Mountain Bell continues on page 13 to say the account is
undisputed.

That is not so.

It says that there should also be

an explanation of why the partnership account has not been paid.
If it had pursued the matter as it was legally required, it would
have a right to find out why by determining partnership assets.
It has not.

If Mountain Bell thinks it will lose the account by

virtue of the statute of limitations, this fault is Mountain
Bell's for failure to use the regular judicial process to
liquidate a presently contingent claim.

It still could file a

civil suit to determine liability in the courts if it would.
On page 14, Mountain Bell states Plaintiffs did not order
a copy of the transcript and therefore must rely on the pleadings
and documentary evidence.

There is no merit to such an argument.

The transcript will be before the court by the time this matter
is to be decided and to disallow reviewing it would be a travesty
of justice.
9

The rules provide that the record will be prepared

by the administrative agency and submitted.

The secretaries at

the PSC had a duce of a time even determining who took the
record, who was the court reporter, and this was way after the
fact when Plaintiffs checked with the PSC to see why the record
had not been prepared and sent.

In fact, to this date, it has

not been determined who the court reporter is who recorded the
pre-trial conference held prior to the regular hearing.
The prejudice and bias is clearly manifested in the
record and the PSC shows its improper feelings through their very
commentary in the orders.

Moluntain Bell is greatly false

when it says the evidence and material facts were the only
consideration of the administrative judge and the PSC.

The fact

that the claimant or any of them are from one profession or
another has no bearing on the matters.

Considering it and

letting it influence one's passion is prejudicial in and of
itself.

It would be good for the judicial branch to remember the

statue of justice with her eyes blindfolded more regularly in
their striving for objective consideration of issues by considering only those facts germane to the issues.
As far as an advisory opinion goes for aid to the
District Court, all that Appellants desire is for a clear and
crisp pronouncement to be made for the aid and guidance of the
district courts, parties, and PSC as to whether the* disconnection
and transfer tariffs are to be determined valid by the PSC before
a party can pursue a money damages claim involving conduct
pertaining to the types of action at least purportedly covered by
10

them.

Must an aggrieved party complaining against a public

utility be required to have a determination of the validity of a
tariff or practice of a public utility first determined by the
PSC before it can initiate and follow through with a damage suit
in regular district, circuit, or justice of the peace courts?
Please answer this question for us.
On the top of page 16 of its brief, Mountain Bell states
that the PSC cannot interpret.

But at the first of its brief it

argues to the opposite that the PSC has the power to interpret.
Mountain Bell concedes and even asserts at the beginning of its
brief that the PSC is the one to interpret tariffs.
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT ON POINT II.
Mountain Bell argues against constitutional violation but
the Utah Constitution does apply, even if the federal due process
clause does not.

Plaintiffs feel both apply.

do not is to beg the question.

To hold that they

The federal case cited by

Mountain Bell pertaining to the 14th Amendment states that, "The
mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not
by itself convert its action into that of the State."
much more than state regulation here.

There is

A public utility is not a

regular business that is merely subject to state regulation
through licensing, etc.

The Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.

case, 419 US 345, 350 (US 1974) has been misquoted by Mountain
Bell.
Equal protection is still a right violated because, as
stated previous, to hold otherwise means that public utilities
11

can disregard the distinctions in law and privileges and
responsibilities of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and
corporations and associations, etc. and be allowed the singular
privilege of disregarding the procedural requirements established
because of those distinct business entity creations and get away
with it.

Plaintiffs deeply trust that such misplaced irrational

views will not become supreme law in this state.
On page 17, Mountain Bell argues the transfer tariffs in
question are just and reasonable.

The one in existence in

January 1985 was just, reasonable, and lawful as a correct
statement of the law as far as it went but the one in existence
at the time Josephson came down in 1978 and the one Mountain Bell
so cleverly and disceptively had placed back on the books after
this dispute came to fruition, are not.

They run entirely

contrary to the ruling in Josephson.
As for the question of whether business accounts should
or should not be allowed transferred to personal residence
accounts, the resitation of several cases running contrary to
Josephson, our state's law, is a mere rehashing of the question
already reviewed and decided by this honorable Utah Supreme Court
in Josephson v Mountain Bell in 1978. An

equal number of cases

holding the opposite view were considered by our court in
Josephson and the conclusion reached, as stated on page 18 of
Appellants1 Brief and pages 852 and 853 of the Josephson
decision, the "sounder view" is that it is improper to transfer
business accounts to private residence accounts.
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This is people

oriented law and in keeping with the worthy protection of
fundamental rights.

It is the best view (the sounder view) and

is and should remain the law in this great state of Utah.
RESPONDENT'S CONCLUSION
Mountain Bell has avoided drawing any more attention to
the illogical reasoning of the administrative judge regarding
"denial of credit" which disregarded the distinctions between
monopolistic public utilities and regular business in the free
enterprise system.
It hangs its hat on the assertion that partners are as
liable as a partnership for partnership debt but fails to counter
the rock hard law that individual partner property cannot be
resorted to prior to exhaustion of partnership assets or at least
an attempt to execute on partnership assets.
True, a partner is ultimately liable on partnership debt,
but this is the main distinction between a sole proprietorship
and a partnership.

A partnership is a separate distinct legal

entity in and of itself.

A sole proprietor merely does business

through his own or assumed or pseudonyms.

The sole proprietor is

immediately responsible and subject to execution for his just
debts but partners are insulated from immediate execution by the
requirement that partnership assets must be used first before
partners can individually be resorted to to come up with any
remaining just partnership liability.

Public utilities are no

exception and are not exempt from the law and particularly the
procedural and equality standards of our constitutions,
13

Expediency is not what is to be sustained by the judicial system.
Justice is to be sustained which is founded upon fundamental
principles of constitutional creation.

Judicieil interpretation

of the constitutions and the statutory and common law are to be
observed, not circumvented.

Mountain Bell has used a sneaky

course of action in an attempt in this instance and many others
to avoid the clear legal mandate of Josephson.

They should be

stringently reprimanded for such conduct.
The tariff in existence on January 1985 is the proper
tariff which should be reinstated to govern the transfer of one
telephone account to another.

And, if the telephone company or

other public utilities are not content to use the inexpensive
small claims and other civil court systems when it comes to
recovering partnership accounts, then the remedy is not to take
the law in their own hands and to become a law unto themselves
but to promulgate additional provisions for the transfer tariff
consistent with law and constitutional standards providing a
process whereby the rights of individual partners will not be
infringed and partnership assets will be looked to prior to any
resort to the tactics which have been used by Mountain Bell and
its agents and officers and employees in this case.

It is

respectfully requested that the arguments of defendant Mountain
Bell and the faulty process of the PSC be disregarded, that the
proper tariff be reinstated, that directions be given on how
involved the PSC must become when disputes arise between utility
recipients and the utilities before damage actions may move
14

forward in the regular civil courts, and what constitutional
standards should apply.
Dated this 30th day of July, 1986.
V^fry respectfully submitted,

'k"~

Georde" M. McCune
Pro
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Commission, State o £ ^can, x o " Tlllv i 9 8 6.
Utah 84145, on this 30th day of July 198b.
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